Daniel T. Rodgers' 'Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a Progressive Age by Leslie, Bruce
Daniel T. Rodgers. Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics zn a Progressive Age Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1998. 672 pp., 33 halftones, 1 table; ISBN: 0-674-05131-9; 
S35.00 (£21.95) cloth. 
Americans are so imbued with the sense of living in a 'city upon a hill' which is a model to 
the world that a book depicting American leaders enmeshed in a North Atlantic web jars. 
Daniel Rodgers places such a network at the heart of Progressive social reform, informing 
and shaping policy agendas from the 1890s to the New Deal. Starting the reader at the 
Eiffel Tower during the 1900 Paris exposition, Rodgers painstakingly traces the 
international cross-fertilization of Progressive ideas among North Atlantic nations with 
occasional glances toward Italy, Austria, New Zealand, and Australia. Americans from the 
late 1800s to World War Two were unusually willing to look abroad for social models. 
Earlier Americans' certainty of the superiority of their democratic institutions and their 
need to use Europe as a negative backdrop against which to define themselves limited 
borrowings. After World War Two Americans saw themselves as a model for a devastated 
Europe reduced to a Cold War battleground. 
The economic convergence of the leading powers in the late nineteenth century made 
trans-Atlantic cross-fertilization possible. With industrialization came growing similarity 
from the American Midwest to the Ruhr Valley; accompanied by similar social problems. 
Urban chaos, uprooted peasants, stark class differences, and family insecurity were 
recognizably similar. In response a new social politics, a third way between unrestrained 
industrial capitalism and socialism took shape, and was a force to be reckoned with by the 
1890s. Whereas many reformers previously focused on restricting government power, the 
new generation saw government as the only institution able to ameliorate indu- 
strialization's social damage. The resulting thought went under various banners including 
social democracy, sozialpolitilc, la reforme sociale, Fabianism, and progressivism. 
Whereas America had been the laboratory for political democracy, the models of social 
democracy lay elsewhere. Rodgers traces the intellectual origins of American Progressive 
thought to German universities, where German scholars attacked laissez-faire 'Manchester 
economics' and organized the Verein fur Sozialpolitilc to press government officials to 
intervene in the supposedly natural markets. Young American scholars who flocked to 
Germany, returned to create a profession of economics, imbued with German ideas. 
Twenty of the first twenty-six American Economic Association presidents had studied in 
Germany. But while they transformed the academic face of economics, their attempts to 
replicate the political influence of the Verein fur Sozialpolitik soon generated potentially 
career-ending opposition. Most backed off. But Henry C. Adams' concept of the 'natural 
monopoly' provided a viable halfway house between German statism and American 
laissez-faire. And if the German professors' direct entrBe to state power could not be 
duplicated, the role of policy expert, institutionalized in the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science, became an acceptable adaptation. Expertise proved more 
effective than exhortation. Although the 'hidden hand' of seemingly natural markets still 
dominated American thought and law, the new economists partially naturalized the ideas 
that natural monopolies must be regulated and that public intervention could legitimately 
ameliorate some social ills. 
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The North Atlantic Progressive experiment focused on the cities, seen as the ltey to a 
democratic and decent nation-state. The story of urban progressivism (or 'municipal 
socialism') has been often told, but Rodgers traces surprising international influences. 
Progressives fighting for public control of transit systems and utilities were very conscious 
of the parallel efforts in Europe. 'Municipalization was the first important Atlantic-wide 
progressive project' (159). It was a limited success: public ownership was only uniformly 
accepted for water. American urban planners exhibited similar cosmopolitan traits, 
drawing heavily on European ideas. Zoning transferred well, but importation of stronger 
forms of planning was usually thwarted by constit~itional barriers. 
Increasingly the baton of urban social reforin was passed to social worlters concerned 
with daily issues such as housing, unemployment insurance, and workmen's coin- 
pensation. Bismarclc had stolen the march to establish the first social insurance; Britain's 
'new liberals' added old age pensions, minimum wage, school meals, and progressive 
taxation. Soon, growing numbers of Americans including Theodore Roosevelt felt that the 
United States lagged. The sense of crisis yielded results. New Yorlc State passed the first 
American Worltmen's Compensation bill in 1910; twenty-one other states followed within 
three years. Mothers' pensions, child labor laws, and other legislation regulating labor also 
passed before the reform enthusiasm waned. The coming of World War One ended the 
flurry of Progressive legislation but wartime mobilization appeared to fulfill the 
Progressive dream of a more collective, expert-driven society. Instead the unpopularity of 
'war socialism' compounded by the 'Red Scare' buried Progressive reforms and 
discredited foreign models. 
While social politics initially concentrated on industrial and urban problems, reviving 
the dying countryside pre-occupied another trans-Atlantic network. Atomistic indi- 
vidualism was identified as the problem and cooperation, if not collectivism, as the 
solution. The Danish rural revival, based on producer cooperatives and enriched by the 
folk schools, was the most admired model. In the 1920s the producer cooperatives 
flourished in the US heartland, though the spirit was more state-subsidized capitalism than 
communitarian socialism. However the anticapitalist side of the Danish model survived to 
provide New Dealers with a ready-made agenda of policies forged in a trans-Atlantic 
furnace. They saw the rural devastation of the Depression as an opportunity to create a 
more cooperative rural society. The Resettlement Administration was the vehicle, but after 
a few years its model communities encountered growing opposition. Soon Congress 
transformed the Resettlement Administration into the tamer Farm Security Administration. 
Housing was also a focus of suburban and urban New Deal policy, shaped especially by 
Austrian, British, and Weimar examples. Model towns like Greenbelt, Maryland briefly 
offered the hope of providing new working and middle class housing and community. The 
chance for a comprehensive approach came with the Wagner Housing Act of 1937. But 
private housing interests successfully denuded the bill of any provisions beyond providing 
housing of last resort for the poorest Americans, and prohibited unions and cooperatives 
from receiving public funds. After a few hopeful experiments, public housing would be 
linked inextricably to social pathology. In the countryside and city, European models had 
guided New Dealers, but rarely to success. 
The New Deal's great leap of comprehensive social insurance, embodied in the Social 
Security Act of 1935, was based on precedents taken from Bismarck, Lloyd George, and 
European social democracy. Political opposition pared away medical insurance and some 
of the benefits for the most vulnerable workers. What survived was based on the repository 
of ideas developed during decades of trans-Atlantic discussions that were readily available 
when crisis provided the political opportunity. 
For Rodgers, the American response to Britain's wartime Beveridge Report marlts the 
end of 'the Americans' Atlantic social-political era' (485). The report's publication in 1942 
initially excited Americans and FDR briefly talked of an American version. But its 
emphasis on minimal levels coupled with Britain's econoinic decline soon soured the 
reception. While Beveridge sounded hopeful to Britons, he seemed dour to growth-minded 
Americans. Basking in economic superiority and viewing Europe as a basket-case to be 
saved from Soviet blandishments, post-war Americans saw themselves as the model. 
Whereas New Dealers had extolled foreign models to sell their programs, Truman's Fair 
Dealers hid their European debts. As Rodgers points out, for Americans after World War 
Two, 'having saved the world, it would not thereafter by easy to imagine that there was 
still much to learn from it' (508). American exceptionalism has since dominated the 
rhetoric, and usually the reality, of modern social reform. 
The author's stance shifts halfway through. The title suggests comparative history and 
the book's opening transports us to the 1900 Paris Exposition. Through the first half of the 
book, Rodgers takes the reader on a cosmopolitan journey criss-crossing the Atlantic. 
Later Rodgers increasingly depicts the vantage point of Americans looking outward for 
inspiration; foreign ideas become just that. The book might have come full circle from its 
opening scene by examining the 1939 New York World's Fair. And a discussion of trans- 
Atlantic Progressive linkages would have been more complete if it discussed the impact of 
CmigrCs fleeing Fascism; many participants in the network unexpectedly became 
American residents. 
These quibbles aside, this is an impressive and informative work that will sensitize any 
reader to the international influences in the Progressive tradition. In particular, Rodgers 
deftly depicts the misunderstandings and dangers inherent in adopting social policies 
outside of their cultural context. Rodgers offers a model of sensitivity to how seemingly 
similar ideas change meaning as they cross borders. Despite the book's many felicitous 
turns of phrase, interesting examples, and useful insights; its length will deter readers not 
deeply interested in the international aspects of Progressive social thought. But those 
interested in the Progressive tradition or in the formation of specific American social 
policies will be well rewarded by sampling relevant sections. Most impressive are those on 
the early economists' encounter with Germany, fin de siecle municipalization and urban 
planning, social insurance before World War One, and housing policies and rural 
cooperatives between the wars. James Kloppenberg's Uncertain Victovy provides an 
excellent complement, describing the broader intellectual connections of North Atlantic 
social democracy and progressivism, while Rodgers details the social policies born under 
that umbrella. 
Rodgers raises the broader q~~estions about the role of foreign models in modern 
America. The thought of a politically astute incumbent President seeing electoral 
advantage in dispatching a high-profile commission to study Swedish cooperatives, as 


